We adopt the Shapley value approach to examine the fair allocation of the depreciation charges among the time periods of the asset's useful life. Essentially, the allocation under the Shapley value solution rewards each time period of the asset's useful life with a share of the earnings that corresponds to its "responsibility" in the earnings-generating process. The latter is thus consistent with the developments in accounting standards, which maintain that the depreciation and amortization methods should reflect the pattern in which the asset's economic benefits are consumed by the enterprise. We show that the Shapley solution always conforms to a set of fundamental accounting requirements such as the matching principle and the impairment test. Moreover, unless the asset is associated with constant revenues and/or extremely profitable investments, the Shapley value solution can never coincide with the prevalent straight-line depreciation method. Finally, we identify the family of earnings patterns for which the Shapley solution coincides with the equal surplus and the economic depreciation methods.
Introduction
Consider a group of T managers who jointly purchase an asset whose original cost equals A and which, combined with the managers' input, is expected to produce a net cash flow denoted by Y. The managers, whose abilities and devoted efforts are assumed to be exogenous and fixed (but not necessarily even), must decide ex ante on how to divide the produced earnings, A Y − , among themselves, such that the division conforms to a reasonable and an acceptable criterion.
We argue that this traditional cooperative game theory problem 1 is conceptually identical to that of selecting an appropriate depreciation method for financial reporting purposes: By substituting each manager with one of the T time periods of an asset's useful life, the managers' cost allocation problem becomes equivalent to the question of appropriately dividing the economic profit generated by an asset among the time periods of the asset's useful life. The latter then, in effect, dictates the division of the asset's depreciation charges among the time periods of its useful life.
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In essence, this study links the fair division literature and the practical accounting problem concerning the appropriate depreciation method. Accounting standards assert that the employed depreciation method should reflect the pattern in which "the asset's economic benefits are consumed by the enterprise" [see International Accounting Standard (IAS) 16, paragraph 60] and that "the method of amortization shall reflect the pattern in which the economic benefits of the intangible asset are consumed or otherwise used up. If that pattern cannot be reliably determined, a straight-line amortization method shall be used" [see Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 142 item 12]. These guidelines, thus, manifest an unambiguous approach toward depreciation and amortization, namely, that despite its extensive use, the straight-line method should not be automatically implemented but rather the selected method should primarily be related to the asset's produced economic benefits. corresponds to its "responsibility" in generating the total earnings. 4 In that respect, the straight-line depreciation method (as well as the other commonly-used depreciation methods) ignores the pattern of the produced earnings and, instead, arbitrarily evenly allocates the earnings among the periods of the asset's useful life. Our framework thus effectively proposes a normative ruling for the allocation of the earnings generated by a given asset among the periods of its useful life. The adopted approach further generates an insight into what is considered as fair depreciation: a depreciation method is fair if the allocation of the earnings among the time periods is fair.
Recall that Shapley (1953) shows there exists a unique solution that conforms to the following properties: a) efficiency -the sum of the individual surplus (earnings) allocated to each player (each time period of the asset's useful life) equals the total surplus; b) symmetry -players (time periods) that identically contribute to the surplus function for every coalition (of time periods) attain the same individual surplus (the same depreciation charge); c) dummy player -players (time periods) that do not affect the surplus function for every coalition (of time periods) attain no surplus (and thus also attain a zero depreciation charge); and d) additivity -for a given set of players (time periods), the Shapley value that attains for a sum of m games (assets) m=1,2,…,M, is equal to the sum of the Shapley values separately solved for each game (asset). For example, for two identical assets with the same useful life and cost but with different produced cash flow profiles, the sum of the earnings separately computed for each asset is equal to the earnings computed for an asset whose cost and produced cash flow profile are equal to the sum of the two separate assets.
Note that while property (a) guarantees efficiency, with the entire earnings are allocated among all time periods of the asset's useful life, properties (b) and (c) ensure that the solution conforms to standards of fairness. Property (d), which relates the Shapley values derived from different games, guarantees the uniqueness of the solution. In what follows, we use the term earnings to refer to earnings after taxes and before interest and depreciation. Also, for more on the concept of fairness within the Shapley value framework, see Moulin (2003) . For an extensive survey of the Shapley value literature, see, for example, Roth (1988) and Hart (forthcoming) . 5 Various alternative interpretations of the Shapley value are proposed in the literature: Hart and Mas-Collel (1989) show that the Shapley value is a marginality concept: it measures the marginal contribution of each player to the "grand coalition"(of all players) according to a unique Potential function, where the marginal contributions sum up to the value of the "grand coalition". Roth and Verrecchia (1979) show that the Shapley value may further provide a costless surrogate for allowing the cost allocation to be determined by a bargaining process between interested parties. They conclude that this is consistent with accounting concepts of fairness, equity, and neutrality. Ben-Shahar, Margalioth, and Sulganik (forthcoming) propose an axiomatic system "to which any depreciation method-conforming to fundamental accounting principles-must obey" (page 1). The system they propose is consistent with the matching principle and the accounting for impairments, among others.
6 Following Ben-Shahar et al. (forthcoming), we then show that the Shapley value solution always conforms to this set of fundamental accounting principles and, hence, conforms to both the matching and the impairment principles.
Also, because both within and outside the US, the vast majority of corporations use the straight-line depreciation method, according to which the nominal cost of the asset is evenly distributed among its predicted useful years, we further examine the Shapley value solution vis-à-vis the straight-line method. Interestingly, however, we show that the Shapley value solution does not coincide with the straight-line depreciation method unless the asset is associated with a fixed stream of revenues (in present value terms) and/or with extremely profitable investments (namely, that each period of the asset's useful life single-handedly turns the investment into a profitable one). Finally, we identify plausible circumstances under which the equal surplus and the economic depreciation methods coincide with the Shapley value solution.
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The Shapley value approach has been previously applied to various topics in the accounting literature. For example, Roth and Verrechia (1979) and Hamlen, Hamlen, and Tschirhart (1980) adopt the Shapley value solution concepts for cost allocation problems within the managerial accounting framework. More closely related to our analysis, Callen (1978) adopts the Shapley value approach for allocating a firm's depreciation among projects that mutually contribute to the firm's revenues. His work proposes an answer to the question regarding the proportion of the firm's depreciation that should be allocated to new investment projects vis-à-vis the existing ones. Aparicio and Sanchez-Soriano (2008) further adopt a cooperative game approach to examine current and new depreciation 6 Maintaining the matching principle implies that for all period i and j of the asset's useful life, if period i's earnings (associated with the asset) are no smaller than period j's earnings, then i's depreciation charge and earnings after deduction of depreciation must be no smaller than those of j. The impairment principle requires that a profitable asset at the time of purchase (that is, an asset whose associated present value is no less than its cost) should never be subject to impairment recognition during its useful life as long as there is no change in the fundamental economic variables. In their axiomatic system, Ben-Shahar et al. (forthcoming) further require that depreciation charges are non-negative and that any periodic depreciation charge is no greater than same period's earnings. They then show that none of the prevalent depreciation methods (such as straight-line) altogether ex ante conforms to the axiomatic system. 7 Recall that, according to the economic depreciation method, the annual depreciation charge equals the present value of same year earnings, where the present value is computed by substituting the cost of capital with the internal rate of return. methods. Our conceptual approach resembles that of Aparicio and SanchezSoriano (2008) in that we also consider the time periods of the asset's useful life as cooperating agents in a production game; however, in our analysis the depreciation game is a function of the periodic earnings, while their depreciation game is a function of the asset's salvage value at every period. 8 Finally, it should be noted that the Shapley value solution has been applied in many practical frameworks outside the accounting literature. See, among others, Littlechild and Thompson (1977) for the allocation of aircraft landing fees, Shorrocks (1999) for the analysis of poverty and the measurement of inequality, Chantreuil and Trannoy (1999) for the examination of inequality and decompositions, Mussard and Peypoch (2006) for the analysis of productivity, and Ben-Shahar, Deng, and Sulganik (2009) for the allocation of the land and construction costs in high-rises.
In Section 2 we develop the model and derive the results. We summarize in Section 3.
The Model
Consider an asset whose depreciated cost is A. The asset's production is expected to generate a stream of earnings before interest and depreciation Y=(y 1 ,…y T ), where the earnings attributed to period i (i=1,…,T), y i , are generated by the revenue and expense from sales of the entire production of that period and T denotes the number of periods during which the asset will be in service (that is, T represents the useful life of the asset). We assume that there is certainty with respect to the earnings flow, 9 that Y is independent of the earnings flow of other assets, and that the earnings sustains (1)
where r denotes the cost of capital associated with the particular asset. Inequality (2) thus conforms to the set of ex ante economically efficient investments, i.e., it conforms where there is no economic loss embedded in acquiring the asset.
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Finally, we assume that there exists no uncertainty with respect to T and that the residual value of the asset is, without loss of generality, equal to zero. Denote the depreciation charge that is allocated to period i by d i and let D=(d 1 ,…,d T ) represent the vector of depreciation charges over the useful life of the asset.
11 Finally, let <A, y 1 /(1+r),…,y T /(1+r) T > be a depreciation problem. That is, we define a depreciation problem as one composed of two components: an asset with an original cost equal to A and a vector consisting of the present value of the periodic earnings generated by the asset over T periods. Now, recall that following Shapley (1953) , the Shapley solution for a cooperative game of T players may be written as
where ϕ j is the Shapley value associated with player (time period) j, j∈S; S is any possible coalition of 1,2,…,T; s is the number of players in S; and V{S} is the value of the coalition S. Now, consider the case where the value function V{S} of any coalition S of the time periods, 1,…,T, of the asset's useful life, satisfies
The rationale for the formulation in (4) is straightforward: V{S} measures the economic profit jointly generated by all periods included in S (and only those periods). The solution for the Shapley value, following Equations (3) and (4), then represents the period's fair reward for its contribution to the total economic profit. Given the vector Y=(y 1 ,…y T ), however, the periodic (discounted) earnings after depreciation are represented by y i /(1+r) i -d i and the latter should thus equal ϕ i . In other words, d i is determined such that, after it is subtracted from the periodic earnings, the outcome represents period i's fair share in the total profits. Hence (5)
10 It should be noted that depreciation of positive net present value investments under certainty, is the subject of comprehensive discussions. See, among others, Beaver and Dukes (1974) and Feltham and Ohlson (1996) . 11 That is, D is the expected depreciation charges from an ex ante perspective. Ex post, depreciation charges may change for various reasons, such as revised estimates. 12 For the value function in Equation (4) see also Moulin (1988) , p. 149.
Properties of the Shapley Value Solution
Ben-Shahar, Margalioth, and Sulganik (forthcoming) propose an axiomatic system to which any depreciation and amortization method-complying with the guidelines set by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)-must obey. Essentially, the axiomatic system requires that, from an ex ante perspective, the depreciation method conforms to both the matching and the impairment principles. 14 Formally, the requirements of the axiomatic system are the following. 
The requirement in Axiom 1 states that, under the assumption of nonnegative periodic earnings associated with a given asset, the periodic depreciation charge must also be non-negative (otherwise, it is both undetermined and undesired from the earnings management perspective). The requirement in Axiom 2 corresponds to the matching principle: the recognition of expenses by the association of costs and revenues on a cause-and-effect basis. Axiom 2 thus guarantees that no period ever experiences depreciation that is greater than the present value of the corresponding produced earnings. Finally, Axiom 3 accounts for the main aspect of the matching principle: higher (or equal) periodic earnings (in present value terms) must be associated with a higher (or equal) depreciation charge (but can never be associated with a smaller level of depreciation) and, at the same time, the attained order of the level of earnings (in present value terms) cannot be reversed due to the employed depreciation method.
Following the axiomatic system, we argue 13 An alternative presentation of (5) is to argue that ϕ i is the Shapley allocation of the earnings after depreciation; that is,
14 See, once again, footnote 6 in the Introduction section concerning the definition of these principles. Hence, applying the Shapley value approach for the computation of the depreciation charges always produces a depreciation method that sustains both the matching and the impairment principles. Moreover, it follows from Proposition 1 that the axiomatic system further embraces deprecation methods that are consistent with fair division.
The Shapley Value Solution and Straight-Line Depreciation
Examining the straight-line depreciation in light of the Shapley value approach, several preliminary results immediately emerge:
Proposition 2: If V{S}>0 for all coalitions S, then the Shapley value solution coincides with the straight-line depreciation method.
Proof: See Appendix.
That is, there is a direct correspondence between the straight-line method and the Shapley solution in the case where V{S}>0 for all S, i.e., when the original depreciated cost of the asset, A, is relatively minuscule such that each period of the asset's useful life can single-handedly turn the investment into a profitable one. We thus refer to the earnings flow examined in Proposition 2 as superprofitable.
In addition,
Proposition 3: If y i =y j =y for all i and j, r=0, and
A ky A y k − ≤ < − − 0 ) 1 ( for some k, 1≤k≤T
, then the Shapley value solution coincides with the straight-line depreciation method.
In contrast to the conditions of Proposition 2, it follows from the conditions of Proposition 3 that, even when V{S} is equal to zero for some S, the straight-line method may yet coincide with the Shapley solution. This, according to Proposition 3, may occur when the periodic earnings are fixed, r=0, and the investment in the asset is not economically inefficient.
In addition, 
Proof:
The result follows immediately from Proposition 3.
We refer to the earnings flow examined in Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 as a constant earnings flow. We show in Proposition 2 and 3 and Corollary 1 that the Shapley value solution supports the straight-line method in two cases: when the total earnings are evenly distributed among the time periods of the asset's useful life and when each period can singly-handedly operate the asset profitably. We now turn to the central result summarizing the Shapley solution vis-à-vis the straight-line depreciation method: 
for all i and j and
for some k, 1≤k≤T.
Theorem: For a given depreciation problem <A, y 1 /(1+r),…,y T /(1+r) T >, the Shapley value solution coincides with the straight-line depreciation if and only if the earnings generated by an asset are either super-profitable or constant.
Proof: See appendix.
It follows that the commonly used straight-line depreciation method incorporates the periodic variation in the earnings pattern only in the cases where it is, in effect, irrelevant, i.e., when no meaningful need for earnings allocation emerges. Moreover, following Proposition 1, it turns out that every Shapley solution conforms to the fundamental set of axioms (see, once again, Axioms 1-3). It further follows from the theorem, however, that while the straight-line depreciation method may comply with the axiomatic system under various earnings settings, in most plausible circumstances it may not concurrently maintain the fairness conditions (in the Shapley value sense).
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Specific Cases Conforming to the Shapley Value Solution
We show the Shapley value solution for the depreciation method that results in for a specific family of earnings flow: Proof: See Appendix. The depreciation method that arises in Proposition 4 is referred to as the equal surplus solution [see Moulin (1988) ]. It simply equalizes the earnings (in net present value terms) after depreciation among the time periods.
Furthermore, denoting the asset's internal rate of return by IRR, it immediately follows from Proposition 4 that That is, whenever the participation of all time periods (of the asset's useful life) is required for generating positive net present value, then the Shapley solution leads to the equal surplus depreciation method, which becomes the economic depreciation method for r=IRR.
Summary
We adopt the Shapley value solution concept in order to examine the depreciation method that is consistent with the fair division approach. The meaning of fairness in this context is that each time period of the asset's useful life is rewarded by a level of earnings (before interest and depreciation) that corresponds to its "responsibility" in generating the asset's economic benefits. By adopting a cooperative game theory setting in which each time period of an asset's useful life is considered as a single agent participating in a joint production process, we show that the Shapley value solution to the allocation of the depreciation charges always conforms to a set of fundamental accounting requirements, including both the matching and the impairment principles. Also, we show that unless the asset is associated with a fixed revenue stream (in present value terms) and/or extremely profitable investments, the Shapley value solution can never coincide with the straight-line depreciation method. Finally, we identify plausible circumstances under which the equal surplus and the economic depreciation methods coincide with the Shapley value solution.
The advantage of applying the Shapley solution in this context is twofold. First, it produces depreciation charges that directly depend on the asset's generated earnings, thereby complying with recent developments in accounting concepts, which assert that the depreciation and amortization methods should reflect the use of the asset in the revenue generating process (see, for example, SFAS 142 item 12 and IAS 16, paragraph 60). Secondly, it conforms to standards of economic efficiency and fairness and, as such, mutually benefits the concerning parties of the operating entity (such as share-holders, debt-holders, managers, and regulators). 
Appendix
Proof of Proposition
It follows from (5) and (A4) that the total depreciation of size A is equally allocated among the time periods and, hence, the straight-line depreciation method arises.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Consider all permutations of 1,…,T. Following (4), i's marginal contribution to the value function is non-negative only if i>k-1. In 1/T of the cases, i is in the k-th place and its contribution is then equal to ky-A. Also, if k<T, then in 1/T of the cases i is in the k+1 place and its marginal contribution is then equal to y. The latter further holds for all T≥i>k+1. Finally, by the definition in (4), i's marginal contribution equals zero for all i≤k-1. Therefore, we get
where the latter immediately reduces to T A y i / − = ϕ (note that for the case where k=T, the same immediately applies). Together with (5), we see that the total depreciation of size A is equally allocated among the time periods and, hence, the straight-line depreciation method emerges.
Proof of Theorem:
Refer to the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 and Corollary 1 for sufficiency (if the earnings are either super-profitable or constant, then the Shapley value solution coincides with the straight-line depreciation method). Proving the necessary condition (if the Shapley value solution coincides with the straight-line depreciation method, then the associated earnings are either super-profitable or constant), note that any earnings flow (generated by a profitable asset whose cost equals A) that is neither super-profitable nor constant maintains the following conditions: (A5) Finally, note that for the case where V{1,…,T}=0, it follows from (2) that the right-hand side of (A8) is equal to zero and hence that (A9) reduces to d i =y i /(1+r) i .
Proof of Corollary 2:
Note that, by definition, , which is the economic depreciation method.
